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A B S T R A C T
We elicit citizens' preferences over hypothetical candidates by applying conjoint survey experiments within a probability-based online panel of the Norwegian
electorate. Our experimental treatments diﬀer in whether citizens receive information about candidates' social characteristics only, candidates' issue positions only,
or both. From this, we identify whether citizens are able to infer substantive policy positions from the descriptive characteristics of potential representatives and use
that information to make candidate choices that achieve substantive representation. We ﬁnd that candidate choice is driven more by knowledge about candidates'
issue positions than by knowledge about their social characteristics and that citizens value substantive representation more robustly than descriptive representation.
Importantly, while the direct experimental test of whether voters use the information they obtain from descriptive markers to choose a candidate that gives them
substantive representation is inconclusive, we ﬁnd that voters form beliefs about candidates' issue positions based solely on candidates’ social characteristics.
1. Introduction
Representation is the mainstay of modern democracies, and the
study of descriptive representation – political representation based on
shared social characteristics – has often been at the centre of scholarly
attention (Mansbridge, 1999, 2003; Bratton and Ray, 2002; Reynolds,
2013). Many studies have concluded that descriptive representation is
crucial in supporting the principles of democracy: Citizens tend to be
more willing to accept a political decision made by a representative
body that descriptively reﬂects society (Arnesen and Peters, 2018),
have more trust in such an institution (Pitkin, 1967; Bobo and Gilliam,
1990), feel symbolically represented by it (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler,
2005), see this institution as more responsive (Fenno, 1978; Pantoja
and Segura, 2003; Banducci et al., 2004; Sanchez and Morin, 2011),
and are more likely to seek political participation in it (Gay, 2002;
Broockman, 2014). A lack of descriptive representation has been linked
to policy outcomes biased against, for example, women and minorities
(Bratton and Ray, 2002; Franck and Rainer, 2012).
The mechanism by which descriptive representation may exert such
positive eﬀects is well theorized: In contexts in which politically
disadvantaged groups distrust elected oﬃcials or the interests of such
groups are not clearly articulated, a descriptively representative poli-
tician may be better able to gain trust, communicate with the group,
and, mostly through shared experience, comprehend and represent the
groups’ interests (Mansbridge, 1999). In this way, descriptive re-
presentation is inherently linked to substantive representation – poli-
tical representation based on shared political preferences (Pitkin,
1967).1
Our study provides an empirical test of the existence of this link
between descriptive and substantive representation. In particular, we
consider whether citizens are able to infer substantive policy positions
from the descriptive characteristics of potential representatives. We
also examine whether citizens use the information entailed in de-
scriptive representation to make candidate choices that achieve sub-
stantive representation.
Our experimental design elicits how candidate characteristics and
issue positions drive citizens' decision-making, whether citizens value
descriptive representation, substantive representation, or both, and
whether citizens infer candidates' issue positions from candidates' social
characteristics. In combination, these measures allow us to gain insights
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into whether citizens use the information entailed in being descriptively
represented to choose representatives that share their substantive in-
terests. We embed two conjoint experiments in two waves of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP).2 The respondents in experiment 1, the
ﬁrst wave, are oﬀered a series of choices between a pair of hypothetical
candidates while seeing, in random order, the candidates' social char-
acteristics only, the candidates' political preferences only, or both. In
experiment 2, the second wave, we show respondents additional can-
didate proﬁles containing social characteristics only and elicit whether
they infer candidates' issue positions from the information provided.
The hypothetical choice situation that respondents face is calibrated to
closely reﬂect the features of existing political competitions in Norway.
The respondents are given the candidates' policy positions on the em-
pirically salient issues of income inequality, refugee rights, and emis-
sions reductions. The candidates’ social characteristics are age, gender,
relationship status, educational level, religion, region of residence, and
occupation, representing traditional or current cleavages.
In experiment 1, we ﬁnd that, on average, the respondents are more
likely to choose a middle-aged candidate than a young or elderly can-
didate, are more likely to choose a female candidate than a male can-
didate, are more likely to choose a candidate with a doctorate than one
without higher education, and are more likely to choose a Christian or
non-religious candidate than a Muslim candidate. Citizens also prefer
representatives who share their religious or educational background.
The respondents tend to reject representatives who disagree that the
state should reduce income inequality and tend to dislike re-
presentatives who agree that refugees should have the same right to
social assistance as native Norwegians. They prefer substantive re-
presentation by candidates who share their policy preferences on in-
come inequality and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Importantly,
when respondents observe both the candidates' social characteristics
and policy preferences, the inﬂuence of social characteristics on can-
didate choice decreases. This ﬁnding speaks to the argument that voters
use descriptive information to make inferences about candidates' policy
preferences, and this information is no longer needed when information
on candidates' issue positions is also provided. While we obtain in-
conclusive ﬁndings on the direct test embedded in experiment 1 of
whether voters use the information they obtain from descriptive mar-
kers to choose a candidate that gives them substantive representation,
experiment 2 indicates that voters form beliefs about candidates' issue
positions based solely on candidates’ social characteristics.
Our study adds to the literature that seeks to clarify the relationship
between descriptive and substantive representation theoretically
(Mansbridge, 1999, 2009; Pitkin, 1967) or empirically (see, among
others, Gay (2002); Bratton and Ray (2002); Hayes and Hibbing
(2017)). In particular, our experimental design allows for better iden-
tiﬁcation of that relationship. The results reveal that voters infer policy
positions based solely on the social backgrounds of political candidates.
We further extend the empirical literature on representation to consider
the case of Norway, a country that has inspired prominent past work on
social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) that remain inﬂuential in
their eﬀect on political attitudes and behaviors, but also a country with
an increasingly diverse population asking for adequate political re-
presentation. Notably, in the current Norwegian context, Muslim can-
didates are less likely to be preferred by the voters than non-religious or
Christian candidates. While a Muslim candidate faces signiﬁcant hur-
dles with Norwegian voters, this religious identity decreases in im-
portance as citizens learn about the candidate's issue positions.
2. Theory
2.1. Candidate choice and descriptive representation
Candidate choice, even when a decision has to be made between
party lists, has always been to a large degree about selecting between
alternative representatives, their social characteristics, their personal-
ities, and the policy positions they represent (Campbell et al., 1960;
Popkin and Popkin, 1994; Stokes, 1966; Hayes, 2009). When making
this choice, voters certainly consider a large set of candidate attributes,
including shared social markers, candidates’ issue positions and other
characteristics of candidates, such as their party, competence, looks,
personality traits, celebrity status, incumbency status, and prior ex-
perience in oﬃce. The literature has extensively studied the question of
how such features determine candidate choice (for an overview, see
Dalton (2013)).
Extant literature has argued for the importance of each of these
candidate characteristics: Incumbency status is said to increase candi-
dates' electoral prospects (Berry et al., 2000; Burden, 2004; Cox and
Katz, 1996; Hogan, 2008; Stone et al., 2010; Gelman and King, 1990),
as are certain personality traits (Chen et al., 2012; Patterson et al.,
1992; Klein and Rosar, 2005) or social characteristics (Cutler, 2002;
Greenwald et al., 2009; Sanbonmatsu, 2002), especially when voters
share these characteristics (i.e., gender (Burrell, 2010; Dolan, 2003,
2010) but see Sanbonmatsu (2002); or ethnicity/race (Chandra, 2004;
Kaufmann, 2004)), and policy positions close to voters’ preferences
ensure electoral success (Macdonald and Rabinowitz, 1989). While this
literature provides rich insights, interaction eﬀects among those can-
didate characteristics in determining voters choices create challenges
for identiﬁcation.
Employing experimental designs similar to ours, some works at-
tempt to separate the competing and interacting candidate character-
istics that inﬂuence candidate choice. In a conjoint experiment,
Horiuchi et al. (2017) examine Japanese voters to explain how, in ad-
dition to social characteristics such as age and gender, local ties, prior
experience, dynastic families ties, and celebrity status aﬀect vote
choice. They ﬁnd that voters dislike older and celebrity candidates but
are indiﬀerent to candidates' gender or dynastic family ties. Kirkland
and Coppock (2017) use a similar design to investigate whether can-
didates' experiences become a stronger determinant of voters' decision-
making once information about candidates' partisanship is no longer
available and ﬁnd that it does. While conjoint experimental designs to
study candidate choice do not directly mimic real-world election si-
tuations of the countries in which they have been conducted, they
successfully tease out citizens’ preferences over candidate character-
istics (Schwarz et al., 2018).
For citizens to consider individual candidates by any kind of attri-
bute, they need experience with an electoral system that is suﬃciently
personalized that citizens can include such considerations about can-
didates' individual characteristics into their decision-making. Electoral
systems vary in the incentives for casting preference votes for in-
dividual candidates (Adams, Grofman and Merrill, 2005a). While
single-member district electoral systems, such as those found in the
United States or the United Kingdom, arguably link constituents to in-
dividual representatives quite well, we also currently observe a perso-
nalization across established European democracies. Even formerly
strictly party-centered political systems are introducing more elements
of direct candidate choice; that is, we see an increasing degree to which
the electoral rules allow citizens to choose which individual candidates
win seats within the legislature (Renwick and Pilet, 2016; Rahat and
Kenig, 2018). Norway is also experiencing a rejuvenated debate about
personalizing the national electoral system, aligning it further with the
country's municipal electoral system (Mjelde et al., 2016). In such
personalized electoral systems, preferences regarding candidates' attri-
butes, resulting in a reduced inﬂuence of candidates' partisanship, be-
come a matter of direct concern for citizens. In other words, judgments
2 In a conjoint experiment, respondents are asked to choose between options
characterized by a bundle of attributes. Researchers are able to elicit re-
spondents' preferences as a function of variation in attributes because the exact
realizations of each attribute across options shown to each respondent vary
randomly.
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about individual candidate characteristics are possible.
When choosing between candidates, voters may make judgments
about potential representatives with respect to whether the candidates
share social characteristics with them. Descriptive representation, then,
allows voters to elect an in-group politician.
2.2. Linking descriptive and substantive representation
Considerations pertaining to the citizens' preferred characteristics of
representatives set the stage for a discussion of whether citizens wish to
be descriptively or substantively represented and whether there is in
fact, as frequently proposed, a meaningful link between those two as-
pects of representation. Scholars who explore the relationship on the
supply side are not as convinced that descriptive representation trans-
lates into substantive representation. Homola (2017) establishes that
descriptive representation (of women) does not imply substantive re-
presentation in the legislatures of Western democracies, despite as-
sumptions to the contrary (Bratton, 2005; Wängnerud, 2009), and
Swain (1993) makes a similar case for African Americans in the US. On
the demand side, to which our study speaks, we may expect to ﬁnd such
a link. For citizens, trust in an elected representative's actions once in
oﬃce, the representative's ability to learn the interests of the con-
stituency and implement meaningful policies that beneﬁt the group
depend greatly on characteristics shared between the citizens and the
representative. Understanding elections as selection mechanisms
(Fearon, 1999; Mansbridge, 2009) requires citizens to infer candidates'
abilities, trustworthiness, or future policy-making from observable at-
tributes. Descriptive representation provides citizens with a candidate
who shares their social characteristics. Therefore, citizens from under-
represented groups should prefer to be represented by politicians who
share their group membership over candidates who do not, so citizens
can be better represented substantively.
Empirically, however, characterizations of the relationship between
descriptive and substantive representation are inconclusive. Several
studies, particularly on the US, have identiﬁed stark variation in the
value that diﬀerent social groups attach to descriptive representation.
This value is lower for Hispanics (Henderson et al., 2016) and women
(West, 2017) than for African Americans. It also varies strongly with
partisanship (Casellas and Wallace, 2015) and whether the winning
candidate comes from a voter's social group (Bowler, 2017). Ad-
ditionally, Carnes and Lupu (2016) ﬁnd variations in voters' valuations
of representation by working-class politicians across countries.
As the closest test of a link between descriptive and substantive
representation in determining candidate choice using observational
data, Gay (2002) shows in the US context that among Black voter, the
valuation of descriptive representation decreases after controlling for
the confounding inﬂuences of representatives' policy positions. This
ﬁnding indicates perhaps that aspects of substantive representation
condition the reach of descriptive representation. More in line with our
research design, Hayes and Hibbing (2017) ﬁnd in a series of survey
experiments that descriptive but not substantive representation aﬀects
African Americans’ senses of being symbolically represented.
These two aspects of representation appear to be interdependent,
but their eﬀects on candidate choice are not yet fully understood. What
mechanism linking descriptive and substantive representation should
we expect to ﬁnd?
2.3. Descriptive representation as a facilitator of substantive representation
Most voters do not care much about political candidates and their
positions per se and use informational shortcuts and heuristics to guide
their electoral decision-making (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1991; Lupia and
McCubbins, 1998, 2000; Kirkland and Coppock, 2017). Voters use
shared social characteristics as cues, and group identity becomes in-
strumental in electoral decisions (Rahn, 1993; Chandra, 2004; Eifert
et al., 2010). They may directly prefer candidates with particular social
characteristics (Campbell and Cowley, 2014; Sanbonmatsu, 2002) or
those with markers that are associated with personal features such as
competence and quality (Schaﬀner et al., 2001; Lim and Snyder, 2015).
Men tend to be seen as better leaders and more competent than women
(Holman et al., 2011, 2017; Burrell, 2008; Paul and Smith, 2008). With
instrumental group identities, citizens may think of descriptive re-
presentation as a mere proxy for substantive representation (Phillips,
1995; Box-Steﬀensmeier et al., 2003; Gay, 2002).
Generally, citizens seem to infer candidate attributes from social
characteristics such as gender (Koch, 2002). For example, in the US
context, women are often seen as less conservative than men
(McDermott, 1997, 1998). Voters discount the actions they expect re-
presentatives to implement once in oﬃce given candidates' attribute
proﬁles (Adams et al., 2004; Adams, Grofman and Merrill, 2005b). Such
inferences may mean that voters attribute shared preferences to re-
presentatives who share their social characteristics. In the work most
similar to our study and design, Jones (2016) tests whether voters infer
policy positions from a candidate's race by endowing hypothetical re-
presentatives with racial/ethnic identities and preferences on ﬁve
policy issues. That study ﬁnds that descriptive representation increases
the perception of substantive representation, but respondents generally
erroneously attribute shared preferences to co-racial/co-ethnic candi-
dates. We demonstrate that for a broader range of salient group markers
in Norway, survey respondents are often able to correctly predict can-
didates' policy preferences based on candidates' social characteristics.
Hypothesis. The main objective of the paper is to understand the link
between descriptive and substantive representation in determining
candidate choice. We argue that citizens can and do take social
characteristics as cues for political candidates’ policy positions. In this
way, descriptive representation facilitates substantive representation.
In particular, we test.
whether citizens use information about political candidates as entailed in
descriptive representation as cues to infer candidates' policy positions to
achieve substantive representation.
2.4. Testing the hypothesis
To establish evidence for our hypothesis about how descriptive re-
presentation links to preferences for representation of shared policy
preferences, we evaluate several claims about citizens' behaviors: (1)
Candidate choice is driven by social characteristics; (2) citizens prefer
political candidates who share their social characteristics; (3) citizens
prefer candidates who represent their policy preferences; (4) citizens
infer candidates' policy positions from information about candidates'
social characteristics; and (5) when citizens learn candidates' policy
positions in addition to their social characteristics, preferences for re-
presentatives are less driven by candidates’ social characteristics than
they are when citizens know social markers only.
If candidate choice is less driven by social markers once policy
preference information becomes available, then citizens may utilize
descriptive representation as a proxy for substantive representation.
When social characteristics are inﬂuential, independent of whether
issue positions are shown, descriptive representation does not allow
instrumental motivations to drive candidate choice. For (5) to support
our hypothesis, though, citizens need to (1) pay attention to social
markers, (2) value representation by candidates who share their social
characteristics, and (3) value representation of shared policy pre-
ferences. In addition, we need to show that (4) citizens infer candidates'
policy positions from descriptive markers only. Otherwise, we cannot
rule out that absent evidence for (5), citizens simply may be unable to
form beliefs about candidates' preferences based solely on the candi-
dates’ social characteristics. Such an ability is the prerequisite both for
the existence of instrumental motivations driving candidate choice and
for descriptive representation being a facilitator of substantive
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representation.3
The proper evidence for identifying such a mechanism may best be
derived from experimental data for several reasons. First, the social
characteristics and policy positions of candidates are often correlated,
making it impossible to separate the two as a determinant of candidate
choice using observational data only. Second, when respondents are
presented with hypothetical candidates, even though doing so di-
minishes the signiﬁcance of their choice, we can present any reasonable
combination of social characteristics and policy positions and com-
pletely characterize respondents' preferences regarding those candidate
proﬁles. Finally, assessing the ways in which minority candidates are
perceived through observational data is a particularly diﬃcult en-
deavor. Most surveys reach only a small number of minorities, and even
if the sample of minority respondents is suﬃciently large, linking
survey responses to the few existing minority representatives may not
be suﬃcient to learn about voters’ preferences.
2.5. Scope of the study
To summarize, in this study, we examine how candidates' social
characteristics and policy positions manifest in citizens' preferences for
representatives. We do not consider several mechanisms that have
proven important for candidate choice, including incumbency ad-
vantage, which existing research suggests increases the electoral pro-
spects of individual candidates (Gelman and King, 1990; Ferreira and
Gyourko, 2009). We also refrain from using party labels when char-
acterizing candidates (but see our discussion of the robustness of our
ﬁndings in Section 6.0.0.2). Previous work on candidate choice
(Hainmueller et al., 2014; Franchino and Zucchini, 2015) has argued
for the exclusion of party labels, referring to the fact that participants’
opinions of a given party may either be correlated with existing attri-
butes or be proxies for attributes that are omitted.
Generally, the scope of our study is relevant to prospective voting.
Certainly, voting also works retrospectively (Fiorina, 1976), but our
framework does not speciﬁcally investigate this mechanism. We elicit
the determinants of citizens’ prospective decision-making, acknowl-
edging that such prospective reasoning is informed by observations
from the past (Banks and Sundaram, 1998; Woon, 2012).
Finally, our experimental vignettes do not oﬀer the option to abstain
from voting. We are not modeling participation but are interested in
which factors drive candidate choice.
3. The case of Norway
Political representation based on social characteristics is likely more
important to voters when diﬀerences between groups within a country
are substantial, and descriptive representation matters most in coun-
tries with a signiﬁcant minority group that is politically under-
represented. The large volume of studies on such cases such as the
United States or India (Gay, 2002; Pantoja and Segura, 2003;
Chauchard, 2014; Pande, 2003) speaks to this observation. In Norway,
social characteristics and descriptive representation are arguably less
inﬂuential on candidate choice. Nevertheless, the case of Norway is
relevant for answering our research question for several reasons. First,
evidence exists of a systematic link between descriptive and substantive
representation on the supply side: Child care provision varies sig-
niﬁcantly with female representation (Bratton and Ray, 2002). Second,
if the results reveal that candidates’ social characteristics matter for
representation and descriptive representation is valued by voters, and if
there is a link between descriptive and substantive representation on
the demand side, we may conclude that similar relationships exist in
other cases in which group cleavages are more salient.4 Third, although
Norway is fairly racially and ethnically homogeneous, it features sig-
niﬁcant group cleavages along religious, geographic, class, and gender
divisions. While race and ethnicity are frequently discussed in the lit-
erature on descriptive representation, gender divisions receive equally
broad attention. We are aware that it may not be possible to generalize
from our ﬁndings to other cases in which certain social cleavages are
more salient than in Norway.
Signiﬁcant sociopolitical cleavages have historically formed in
Norway along the dimensions of economic class (workers vs. capital-
ists), religion (Christian vs. secular), and geography (centre vs. per-
iphery) (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), and mass parties organized along
these lines have formed at critical junctures in the nation's history
(Rokkan and Hagtvet, 1987). Scholars during the last decades of the
20th century observed a de-alignment of traditional socio-political
voting patterns across Europe, which were replaced with so-called post-
material values without socio-structural links (Dalton, 2013; Inglehart,
1997), and similar trends were observed in Norway (Aardal, 2011). We
still regard occupational backgrounds as relevant to voters and as a
potential heuristic for citizens in determining which candidate is more
likely to align most closely with their political preferences. Fig. 1 shows
that policy positions among citizens vary signiﬁcantly based on their
occupational background. The categorization of the occupational
background of the candidates (none/farmer/care worker/oil worker/IT
consultant) is based on the goal of including some of the broad occu-
pational categories of the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Oc-
cupations (ISCO-08).5
Changing voting patterns have also given rise to scholarly debate
about new, emerging cleavages on other socio-structural dimensions
(Knutsen, 2004). For example, education is steadily emerging as a
salient social cleavage in Western democracies (Kitschelt, 1994;
Kitschelt and McGann, 1997; Kriesi, 1998; Kriesi et al., 2006). Analyses
of Danish election surveys and party manifestos reveal the existence of
an educational cleavage by demonstrating a link between voters’ edu-
cational levels, their values, and their votes for authoritarian or liber-
tarian parties (Stubager, 2010, 2013).
Furthermore, equal representation is, in many ways, an integral part
of Norwegian society. For example, in public committees, the law re-
quires both genders to have at least forty percent representation, and
private companies have requirements that oversight boards be com-
posed of at least forty percent of each gender. Nevertheless, while
Norway is considered a progressive country in terms of gender equality,
women have historically been excluded from politics, and even at
present, women's political representation is lower than that of men
(Ringkjøb et al., 2008), making women a politically marginalized
group. In a recent study on political representation in contemporary
Norway, Arnesen and Peters (2018) ﬁnd that women report a greater
desire than men to be descriptively represented by political candidates
that share their gender. Moreover, citizens living in peripheral regions
are more concerned with geographical representation than citizens who
live in the capital, and senior citizens ﬁnd it most important to be re-
presented by a politician who is approximately their same age. In
particular, geographical representation has been a key area of conﬂict,
and the current electoral system incorporates this feature by adjusting
for county population and area when distributing electoral district
seats.
In this study, we consider candidates’ occupations, educational le-
vels, religions, regions of residence (to capture religious and centre vs.
peripheral divides), and genders and relationship statuses (to capture
3 Citizens may hold incorrect beliefs but still believe that they achieve sub-
stantive representation.
4 We thank one of the reviewers for identifying this point.
5 The farmer belongs to major group 6 in ISCO-08 – skilled agricultural,
forestry, and ﬁshery workers; the care worker belongs to major group 5 – ser-
vice and sales workers; the oil worker belongs to major group 8 – plant and
machine operators and assemblers; and the IT consultant belongs to major
group 2 – professionals.
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the inﬂuence of gender roles). We do not include race because racial
minorities represent a small share of the population in Norway, and, in
our judgment, do not constitute a socio-political dimension in the
current political environment.6
The religious attribute, however, is fairly relevant given the recent
waves of Muslim immigration and because Islam signals ethnicity and
immigrant status in addition to being a marker of religious denomina-
tion.
Beyond characterizing the hypothetical candidates with social
characteristics that matter, we also endow candidates with policy pre-
ferences on three issues: reduction of income inequality, extension of
the right to welfare to refugees, and reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. These three issues are considered salient by panel re-
spondents in the most recent wave of the NCP (2017). Fig. 1 illustrates
the relationship between respondents' social attributes and their pre-
ferences on the three policy issues. It shows the change in the predicted
probability of whether a respondent agrees with a policy when we
consider a change in an attribute from a reference category. For ex-
ample, the second-to-top marker associated with the income inequality
issue (left-most panel in Fig. 1) tells us that in comparison to re-
spondents in 18–25 year age group, respondents in the 26–35 year age
group show a .6 higher probability of agreeing with the statement that
income inequality needs to be reduced. In general, the ﬁgure shows that
respondents' social characteristics are signiﬁcantly correlated with their
issue attitudes on the three policies. The respondent's age, gender, re-
lationship status, educational level, religion, region of residence, and
occupation all matter for his or her issue preferences.7
While Norway's electoral system is more party-centered than, say,
the single-member district systems in the US or the UK, there is a lively
discussion on representation and a debate on the personalization of the
national electoral system. The Norwegian electoral system is currently
again under review by an Electoral Law Commission, and one of the
mandates of this commission is to oﬀer recommendations of opportu-
nities for voters to inﬂuence the election of individual candidates, in-
cluding to the Storting (the national parliament).8 One option under
consideration is to increase the personalization of the electoral system,
increasing the similarity of the electoral system at the national level to
the Norwegian local-level electoral system and to other electoral sys-
tems in Europe. Personal voting is commonplace in Norwegian muni-
cipal elections and has increased over time, with approximately 40
percent of the voters casting a personal vote in municipal elections
(Mjelde et al., 2016).
Recognizing the debate about representation in the Norwegian
electoral system and the eﬀects of looming personalization, a range of
studies have already investigated the eﬀect of adjustments to the re-
presentation of particular groups on the Norwegian party system
(Christensen and Midtbø, 2007; Bergh et al., 2016; Duverger, 1955;
Hellevik, Skard and van der Ros, 1985; Hellevik, 2003; Hellevik and
Bjørklund, 1995). Bergh et al. (2016), for example, examine the po-
tential consequences of introducing preferential voting in Storting
elections but ﬁnd no inﬂuence on gender representation. Similarly,
Christensen and Midtbø (2007) cannot establish a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
gender, age, or educational level on the voters' candidate preferences
within the context of the Norwegian local electoral system, where vo-
ters inﬂuence individual candidate choice (Karvonen, 2004). These
results align with other comparative studies drawing on observational
data that challenge the scope and existence of a gender-biased electo-
rate (Norris et al., 1992; Black and Erickson, 2003) but contrast with
conjoint experimental work, in particular that on the eﬀect of a can-
didate's gender on candidate choice (Schwarz et al., 2018), which ﬁnds
Fig. 1. Change in the predicted prob-
ability of agreeing with three policies
based on a change in respondents' social
characteristics from a reference category.
Observed respondent attributes in the
sample by respondents' preferences on
three policy issues. The dotted line de-
notes the reference category for each
attribute. Bars show one and two stan-
dard errors of the distribution of ob-
served responses.
6 Norway's experience does not feature extreme, historically based diﬀerences
among racial or ethnic groups; however, the country has become more het-
erogeneous over time. While it traditionally had a net outﬂow of migrants,
Norway became a steady net recipient of immigrants in the 1970s (Strom and
Svåsand, 1997). According to Statistics Norway (2018), 17.3 percent of the
Norwegian population immigrated to Norway or were born to immigrant par-
ents.
7 The only issue on which respondents' attributes do not exert a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on attitudes is emissions reduction. No systematic variation exists be-
tween age or occupation groups in the probability of agreeing with the state-
ment that emissions should be reduced.
8 This is not the ﬁrst time the issue of personalization has been up for debate;
an earlier Electoral Law Commission – appointed in 1997 – recommended such
a change, in which candidates would move to the top of the list if they secured
support from at least ﬁve percent of those voting for their list (Valglovutvalget,
2001). The government rejected the proposed change, fearing a lack of balance
in representation based on social characteristics and particularly based on
gender. To date, no list order at any Storting election has ever been changed as
a result of the voters' rankings, strike-outs, or additions of individual candidates
(Matthews and Valen, 1999).
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a robust pro-female candidate bias among voters.
4. Research Design
We present two conjoint experiments implemented in two separate
waves of the NCP, during the spring and fall of 2016 (Ivarsﬂaten et al.,
2016a; b), with 1139 participants in experiment 1 and 1077 partici-
pants in experiment 2. In a conjoint experiment, survey respondents are
presented with one or more choices between two or more alternatives
in which the options are characterized by a bundle of attributes. The
exact realizations of each attribute vary randomly across the alter-
natives within a choice, and which attributes are shown varies across
choices. In this way, the researcher can elicit respondents' preferences
for the alternatives contingent on variation in attributes. In this study,
we elicit citizens’ preferences for potential representatives given a
bundle of candidate attributes on social characteristics and/or policy
positions. A conjoint experiment is an appropriate tool to give us an
unbiased estimate of such preferences.
Conjoint experiments were introduced into marketing and socio-
logical research in the late 1970s and in the last few years have become
a prominent feature of survey-based research in political science
(Bansak et al., 2018). They can handle complex choice situations
wherein several attributes have a meaningful inﬂuence on judgment
(Auspurg et al., 2017; Hainmueller et al., 2014) and have been fre-
quently implemented to study candidate choice (e.g., Schwarz et al.
(2018); Kirkland and Coppock (2017); Carlson (2015); Franchino and
Zucchini (2015); Carnes and Lupu (2015)). Conjoint experiments allow
us to separately estimate the relative eﬀects of a large set of factors on
citizens’ decisions.9
The NCP is a probability-based general population survey panel
administered by the Digital Social Science Core Facility (DIGSSCORE)
at the University of Bergen (UiB). The panel currently consists of ap-
proximately 6000 active participants, and is representative of the
Norwegian population. For this panel, the entire population of Norway
has an equal, non-zero likelihood of being recruited to participate,
which allows us to draw a representative sample of the Norwegian
electorate. Recruitment was conducted by post in November 2013 and
October 2014, and only invited individuals may participate. The re-
sponse rates from the postal recruitment were 20 and 23 percent, re-
spectively. We refer to the methodology reports for further details on
the speciﬁc survey waves 6 and 7 (Skjervheim and Høgestøl,
2016a,b).10
4.1. Experiment 1
In conjoint experiment 1, we ask the respondents which of two
hypothetical candidates they would prefer to represent them in the
national parliament. We give respondents six choices, one after the
other, between two alternative candidates who vary in their attributes
(e.g., social characteristics and/or policy positions). Each individual
choice presents respondents with one of three types of information
about the two candidates (representing three diﬀerent treatments): (1)
The candidates are randomized with respect to the social characteristics
of age, gender, relationship status, education level, religion, region of
residence, and occupation (group treatment); (2) candidates vary in
their stated preferences on three policy issues, income inequality, re-
fugee rights, and emissions reductions (issue treatment); and (3) can-
didates are described by both social characteristics and political pre-
ferences (both treatment). All potential values across the attributes are
shown in Table 1.11 Which of the three types of information about the
two candidates is shown in a particular choice situation varies ran-
domly.
With this series of decisions, we can elicit respondents' preferences
for candidates given candidates' social characteristics and/or their issue
positions, and we can learn how preferences change with variations in
candidate attributes. The respondents' decision is framed, on the screen,
by the following words: “Imagine that you had to choose one of these
two to represent you personally in parliament.” With this wording, we
prompt respondents’ consideration of their own social characteristics
and issue positions in relation to those presented for the potential re-
presentatives. Priming respondents in this way may also induce
heightened concern for the social group with which the respondent
identiﬁes.
In experiment 1, the group treatment shows only social background
attributes. This experiment has seven attribute dimensions, and given
the number of potential values for each attribute, the number of pos-
sible candidate proﬁles is 7x2x4x6x3x3x6= 18,144. The respondents
see a randomly drawn sample of two of these variations in the proﬁles
and are asked to compare the two. The respondents are then asked to
choose which of the two alternative candidates they would prefer to
represent them in the national parliament. The issue treatment shows
only the candidates’ political preferences on three issues, and this
treatment has 7× 7×7=343 possible combinations of unique can-
didate proﬁles. As in the group treatment, the respondents are asked to
choose which candidate they prefer of the two presented within each
decision task. In the both treatment, the respondents are also asked to
make a decision between two candidates, but in this treatment, re-
spondents have information about both the social background attri-
butes and political views of the candidates. Thus, respondents choose
between two proﬁles that are randomly drawn from a universe of
7x2x4x6x3x3x6x7x7x7= 6,223,392 possible candidate proﬁles.
Clearly, the respondents evaluate only a fraction of the possible proﬁles.
Since the proﬁles are randomly sampled from the proﬁle universe with
a uniform probability distribution, we can nevertheless estimate the
average likelihood that the respondent chooses a candidate with a
certain characteristic on each dimension.
4.2. Experiment 2
In conjoint experiment 2, the respondents are presented with a
scenario identical to the group treatment in experiment 1; that is, re-
spondents are given two proﬁles of hypothetical candidates character-
ized by age, gender, relationship status, educational level, religion,
region of residence, and occupation. As in experiment 1, candidate
proﬁles are drawn from a universe of 18,144 diﬀerent proﬁles.
Respondents are then asked to guess which of the two candidates they
think agrees most with one of the three policy issues (shown in random
order).12
9 We did not pre-register our two experiments. All results reported are on the
full set of observations, and no additional treatments were conducted. The
codebook and data are fully available by contacting the Norwegian Centre for
Research Data at http://www.nsd.uib.no/.
10 The data in our analysis come from the “Norwegian Citizen Panel Wave 6,
2016” and “Norwegian Citizen Panel Wave 7, 2016.” The survey was ﬁnanced
by the UiB and Uni Rokkan Centre. The data are provided by the UiB, prepared
and made available by Ideas2Evidence, and distributed by Norwegian Social
Science Data Services (NSD). Neither UiB, Uni Rokkan Centre nor NSD are re-
sponsible for our analyses/interpretations. Section B in the appendix gives de-
scriptive data on our sample.
11 An example of the screen displayed to respondents is given in Figure A1 in
the SI.
12 Additionally, respondents are randomly assigned to groups that present a
hypothetical decision either between two “politicians” or two “persons.” This
assignment enables us to measure whether people perceive politicians as having
diﬀerent views than non-politicians; our results show that they do not (see
Figure C2 in the SI).
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4.3. Identiﬁcation and presentation of results
The identiﬁcation of the relative eﬀect of any attribute, social
characteristics or issue position on the outcome variables and the
identiﬁcation of treatment eﬀects rest on a few assumptions.
First, within each treatment, we estimate the relative importance of
one attribute assigned to the candidate over others. Speciﬁcally, fol-
lowing Hainmueller et al. (2014), we estimate the Average Marginal
Component Eﬀect (AMCE) using an OLS regression of candidate choice
on each factorized attribute, omitting a reference category, with re-
spondent-clustered standard errors and in which respondent-level
idiosyncrasies are relegated to the error term. The AMCE measures the
eﬀect of a speciﬁc attribute category on the outcome variable (either
candidate preference in experiment 1 or belief about whether a can-
didate holds a particular policy position in experiment 2) when we
change the attribute value from the reference category to that speciﬁc
attribute category. For example, the AMCE of a female candidate is the
change in the predicted probability of choosing a female over a male
candidate (the reference category for the gender attribute).
All results are based on such regressions of the outcome variable on
a set of dummy variables for each social attribute and/or policy position
included (excluding a reference category). Throughout this section, we
present the results graphically given the large number of coeﬃcient
estimates (all regression results are available in Tables 7–10 in the SI).
The estimate of the relative eﬀect of each attribute value over a re-
ference category is displayed on the x-axis with the associated one- and
two-standard-deviation conﬁdence intervals.
Second, to obtain an unbiased estimate of the AMCE, we then as-
sume that the order of vignettes shown to respondents and the order of
attributes within displayed proﬁles are irrelevant to a respondent's
choice. To satisfy this assumption, we randomize the order of vignettes
and attributes across respondents and control for order in our regres-
sions. Additionally, the randomization of attributes and realizations of
the values of attributes need to be carried out in such a way that re-
spondents' choices are statistically independent of the vignette assign-
ment (accomplished by randomization within the NCP).
Third, we assume that the number of attributes does not change
responses; a larger number of attributes per proﬁle should not lead to
satisﬁcing, in which respondents use choice heuristics to break down
the complexity of excessive information.13
Fourth, we assume that respondents interpret information about
candidates' political preferences as given and do not infer from these
preferences about a social marker (e.g., interpreting a candidate's
preference on income inequality as a reﬂection of, say, a candidate's
social class or partisanship).
Experiment 1 allows us to estimate the AMCE of candidates' social
characteristics and candidates' policy preferences on candidate choice
and enables us to elicit whether shared social characteristics and shared
policy preferences inform citizens' decisions. From this information, we
can learn whether respondents pay attention to candidates' social
characteristics when choosing between potential representatives, whe-
ther they value representatives who share their social characteristics,
and whether they value representation of shared policy preferences.
Randomly assigned variation in whether citizens see social character-
istics only, policy preferences only, or both provides us with a robust-
ness test of the AMCE and gives us a tool, in combination with ex-
periment 2, for understanding whether respondents infer policy
positions from candidates' social characteristics and use descriptive
representation to infer substantive representation. Experiment 2, more
speciﬁcally, provides more evidence of whether citizens actually form
such beliefs connecting candidates’ social characteristics and their issue
positions.
5. Results
5.1. Do citizens pay attention to candidates’ social characteristics when
choosing a representative?
Result 1 Citizens' preferences for candidates are shaped by candidates'
social characteristics but less so when citizens also learn candidates’ policy
positions.
When citizens see candidates’ social characteristics only (the results
of the group treatment are shown in the left panel of Fig. 2), all can-
didate attributes except for region have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
on candidate choice (at <α . 1). The strongest relative eﬀect, a decrease
in the estimated vote probability of .15 (.10, .20), arises for a Muslim
candidate versus a candidate with no religious aﬃliation (95 percent
conﬁdence intervals are reported in parentheses). On average, the re-
spondents are more likely to choose a middle-aged candidate than a
young or elderly one, a female candidate than a male one, a candidate
with a doctorate than one without higher education, and a Christian or
non-religious candidate than a Muslim one.
Citizens strictly prefer a candidate that has work experience outside
politics but do not diﬀerentiate based on occupation. We also ﬁnd no
eﬀect of the relationship status of the candidate on his or her chances of
being selected by citizens.
Once citizens also see candidates' issue positions, the eﬀect of social
characteristics (that is the diﬀerence in outcome measure from the re-
ference category) on the probability of a candidate being chosen de-
creases in strength, and the signiﬁcance of the eﬀects disappears. This is
Table 1
Attribute dimensions and their corresponding values in experiment 1.
ID Dimension Values
Social group characteristics
age Age [22 years/30 years/40 years/50 years/60 years/70 years/80 years]
gender Gender [Male/Female]
education Completed education [Elementary school/High school/University degree/Ph.D.
region Region of residence [Oslo area/Eastern Norway/Southern Norway/Western Norway/Middle Norway/Northern Norway]
civil Civil status [Living alone/Cohabitant/Married]
religion Religion [Christianity/Islam/No religion]
work Work experience outside of politics [None/Care worker/Farmer/Oil worker/Self-employed/IT consultant]
Political issue attitudes
inequality The state should reduce income inequality [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/
Strongly disagree]
refugee Refugees should have the same right to social assistance as
citizens
[Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/
Strongly disagree]
emissions Most of the carbon emissions reductions should be done
abroad
[Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/
Strongly disagree]
13 Bansak et al. (2018) ﬁnd that choice tasks with up to 30 attributes do not
lead to meaningful changes in the estimates of the relative importance of any
one attribute; our number of attributes is well below this ﬁgure.
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true for all social characteristics except religion. The AMCE of social
characteristics shown to respondents alongside candidates' policy pre-
ferences in the both treatment can be found in the middle panel of
Fig. 2, and the diﬀerence in AMCE between group and both treatment is
shown in the right panel (that is, the diﬀerence in the relative eﬀect of
each attribute on vote choice in the group and issue treatments). The
estimated eﬀects of social characteristics over the reference category
move toward the zero line. The strongest change in the relative eﬀect of
any attribute on the probability that a candidate is chosen is associated
with gender (female over male candidates) and region of residence
(living in remote Eastern and Northern Norway over Oslo). While there
is a positive and signiﬁcant relative eﬀect of being a female candidate
(vs. a male candidate) on candidate preference in the group treatment,
there is no relative eﬀect of variation in gender in the both treatment. In
contrast, while there is no eﬀect of living in Oslo vs. other regions of
Norway in the group treatment, respondents signiﬁcantly penalize
candidates who do not reside in Oslo in the both treatment. The treat-
ment eﬀect on the AMCE is .06 (.00, .11) with =p .05 for female vs. male
candidates, and for living in remote Eastern and Northern Norway vs.
Oslo, it is − −.09 ( .19, .00) with =p .07 and − −.10 ( .20, .10) with
=p .06, respectively. The eﬀect of religion on candidate choice remains
sizable; controlling for candidates’ issue positions does not crowd out
the negative impact a candidate receives for being Muslim.14
Interestingly, citizens' preferences for candidates change less when
comparing their candidate choice in the issue treatment (respondents
see candidates' policy preferences only) and both treatment in contrast
to the diﬀerence between the group and both treatments. Irrespective of
whether citizens know candidates' social backgrounds, they reject
candidates who disagree that the state should reduce income inequality
and candidates who agree that refugees should have the same right to
social assistance as native Norwegians. Fig. 3 places the AMCE of
candidates’ issue positions on candidate choice in issue and both treat-
ments side by side.
Only the income inequality issue resulted in the both condition
having a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect on the AMCE on issue position
values, that is, the diﬀerence in AMCE of some of the issue position
values between the issue and both treatments is statistically signiﬁcant.
Once citizens see candidates' social characteristics in addition to can-
didates' policy preferences, citizens’ preferences decreased only for
candidates who agree with the statement that the state should reduce
income inequality. The treatment eﬀect of the both condition is a
.17 (.06, .27) reduction in the probability of electing a candidate who
agrees ( <p . 01) and a .12 (.01, .23) reduction for candidates who
somewhat agree, ( <p . 05).
5.2. Do citizens value descriptive and substantive representation?
Result 2 We ﬁnd a preference for descriptive representation, but the
desire for substantive representation is more robust.
When shown only social characteristics in the group treatment, re-
spondents discriminate in favor of in-group candidates on some social
characteristics. Fig. 4 shows the estimates of the eﬀect of shared vs.
diﬀerent social characteristics. In the group treatment, a candidate with
the same educational level faces a .04 (.00, .08) higher probability of
being chosen ( =p .06). Candidates featuring the same religious
Fig. 2. Change in the predicted probability of
preferring a candidate based on information about
the candidates' social characteristics (AMCE) for
group (left panel) and both treatments (middle
panel) and the diﬀerence in the change in the
predicted probability of preferring a candidate
between treatments (right panel). In the group
treatment, respondents see candidates' social
characteristics only, while in the both treatment,
they are shown candidates' social characteristics
and policy preferences. For all ﬁgures that follow,
the estimates are based on an OLS regression of
respondents' choices against a set of dummies for
each attribute realization (omitting a reference
category) with standard errors clustered at the
respondent level. The dotted line denotes the re-
ference category for each attribute. Bars show one
and two standard errors of the estimates.
14 We should also note here that the number of Muslim candidates in
Norwegian elections is very small.
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aﬃliation are more often elected, with an estimated increase in the
probability that voters prefer an in-group candidate of .08 (.04, .13),
<p . 01. Citizens’ preferences for candidates who work in the same
occupation are signiﬁcantly lower than for candidates working in a
diﬀerent occupation. This last eﬀect of a decrease in probability of
.10 (.02, .17; with =p .01) is driven by the diﬀerence between candi-
dates without work experience outside politics and those with such
work experience.15
Respondents also choose candidates with similar political pre-
ferences. Fig. 5 shows estimates of the eﬀect of the distance between the
respondents' own and the candidate's issue positions on candidate
choice. In the issue treatment, respondents see only the issue positions
of the candidates, and the predicted probability of choosing a candidate
signiﬁcantly increases as the political distance between the candidate
and respondent decreases. On a seven-point scale, the change from a
large distance (± 4,5,6) to sharing the same preference as the candidate
signiﬁcantly increases the vote probability, by .21 (.13, .30) for income
inequality, .26 (.18, .34) for refugee rights, and .17 (.07, .26) for emissions
reductions ( <p . 01).16 In the both treatment, only the preference
distance on refugee rights is no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
Whether citizens demonstrate a robust preference for in-group
candidates or candidates with similar policy preferences needs to be
judged across all treatment conditions. Here, respondents' valuation of
descriptive representation loses its empirical support in the both treat-
ment for any of candidates’ social characteristics (see Fig. 4), while
their preference for substantive representation remains mostly intact.
5.3. Do citizens use the information entailed in descriptive representation to
achieve substantive representation?
Result 3 Citizens are able to infer candidates' policy positions from the
candidates’ social characteristics but do not clearly use the information they
obtain from descriptive markers to make a candidate choice that gives them
substantive representation.
The results from experiment 1 establish that people discriminate
between candidates based on candidates' social characteristics, and
they prefer in-group candidates on some attribute dimensions; this re-
sult implies a valuation of descriptive representation on these attri-
butes. We ﬁnd a strong preference for candidates who share the same
political preferences as the respondents. These observations raise a
number of questions. Why is the eﬀect of having knowledge about
shared social characteristics on candidate choice more responsive to
also knowing that the candidate shares citizens’ issue preferences than
Fig. 3. Change in the predicted probability of
preferring a candidate based on information
about the candidates' policy preferences in
the issue (left panel) and both treatments
(middle panel) and the diﬀerence in the
change in the predicted probability of pre-
ferring a candidate between treatments (right
panel). In the issue treatment, respondents
see candidates' policy preferences only, while
in the both treatment, they are shown candi-
dates' social markers and policy preferences.
Fig. 4. Change in the predicted probability of preferring a candidate when the candidate's social markers are the same as those of respondents for the group (left
panel) and both treatments (middle panel) and the diﬀerence in the change in the predicted probability of preferring a candidate between treatments (right panel).
15 Note that our sample is too small to measure moderating eﬀects of the
respondents' social markers.
16 We reproduce Fig. 5 in Figure C.1 in the SI displaying the full range of
diﬀerences between candidate and respondent. The interpretation of the results
shown in the ﬁgure in the SI remains the same as that shown in the ﬁgure in the
main text: Respondents prefer candidates who are closer to them in policy
positions on all issues in the issue treatment, and that preference remains intact
(footnote continued)
for the income inequality and emission reduction issues in the both treatment.
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vice versa? In other words, why is there an eﬀect of the both treatment
on the inﬂuence of shared social characteristics (as elicited in the group
treatment) but not so much on the inﬂuence of shared policy pre-
ferences (as elicited in the issue treatment)?
One mechanism, we argue, is that information provided by de-
scriptive representation on shared social markers may function as a
heuristic from which citizens infer candidates' issue positions. We claim
that descriptive representation may serve as such a proxy for sub-
stantive representation when social characteristics lose their power to
predict candidate choice after information about candidates' policy
positions becomes available. The middle column of Fig. 4 shows the
eﬀects estimates of both the respondent and candidate having the same
social characteristics when issue positions are also shown (the both
treatment). The right column shows the diﬀerence between the group
and both treatments, where a statistically signiﬁcant negative diﬀerence
would provide robust evidence that social characteristics are used as
cues for candidates' political preferences. We ﬁnd no statistically sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect at =α .05 of the social characteristics shared between the
voter and the candidate on candidate choice in the both treatment,
whereas shared educational levels, religions, and occupations inﬂu-
enced citizens’ decisions in the group treatment. In the both treatment,
the AMCE of shared educational level is −.02 ( .08, .04), =p .33, the
AMCE of shared religion is − −04, ( .11, .02), =p .08, and the AMCE of
shared occupation is− −.06 ( .14, .01), =p .10. In other words, while the
eﬀect of shared social characteristics on candidate choice diminishes or
vanishes in the both treatment, the diﬀerence between the group and
both treatments is not statistically signiﬁcant. We cannot rule out that
the reduction in AMCE between treatments occurred by chance only.
These results with respect to our hypothesis that descriptive re-
presentation may facilitate substantive representation for citizens come
as a surprise, given that citizens diﬀerentiate candidates by the candi-
dates' social characteristics and prefer those who share their political
preferences. Why are citizens not using the information embedded in
social characteristics in a way observable to us even when no other
information is available ? Is it that they cannot perceive a correlation
between candidates’ social characteristics and political preferences?
Experiment 2 tests whether respondents believe that candidates'
preferences on policy issues are associated with the candidates' social
backgrounds. If respondents form such beliefs, we would take this as
evidence that instrumental motivations are enabled by descriptive re-
presentation. In this case, citizens could use the information provided
by descriptive representation to select candidates that reﬂect their
policy preferences, even if they do not know candidates' exact policy
positions. Experiment 2 shows that respondents' beliefs about candi-
dates' political preferences vary signiﬁcantly with changes in candi-
dates' ages, genders, educational levels, and religions (Fig. 6). Citizens
infer candidates' issue positions based on only knowing candidates'
social characteristics. Substantial variation exists in which preference
citizens attribute to a candidate given the candidate's social
characteristics. Speciﬁcally, except for region of residence, all candi-
dates' social characteristics are thought to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
candidates' policy positions.
Moreover, respondents' beliefs about variation in policy preferences
based on diﬀerences in candidates' social characteristics often align
with the ways respondents’ observed attitudes vary with their social
backgrounds. We ﬁnd congruent patterns of change with variations in
social characteristics in the predicted probability that a respondent
believes that the hypothetical candidate agrees with an issue statement
and the observed proportions of respondents agreeing with that state-
ment. Respondents believe that a female candidate is more likely to
agree with the statements on income inequality and refugees rights but
to disagree with the statement on emissions; see Fig. 6. Correspond-
ingly, as shown in Fig. 1, female respondents are more likely than male
respondents to agree that the state should reduce income inequality and
that refugees should have the same social rights as Norwegian residents
and are less likely to agree that most of the carbon emissions reductions
should be achieved abroad. Variation in educational level triggers si-
milar changes in predicted and observed agreement with the statements
on two of the three policy issues. We see rather diﬀerent patterns of
change with variations in age, religion, and region of residence.
One should be wary of making overly strong inferences, however,
when comparing predicted and observed attitudes because the under-
lying probabilities of the experimental data and the observational data
are diﬀerent.
6. Discussion
6.1. Interpretation of treatment eﬀects
The results from experiment 1 establish that citizens make decisions
based on political candidates' issue positions across diﬀerent decision
situations, both when they learn candidates' policy preferences only and
when they are shown candidates' social characteristics. Citizens base
their choice on candidates' social characteristics if they do not know the
candidates’ policy preferences. They prefer in-group candidates only on
some social attribute dimensions, but we ﬁnd a strong preference for
candidates who share the same positions on important issues.
Throughout, we interpret these results as evidence for a substitution
eﬀect: Citizens base candidate evaluations mostly on issue positions and
only to a lesser extent on social characteristics.
While we treat candidates' issue positions and social characteristics
as being considered separately once respondents are presented with
both pieces of information about the candidate, some of the literature
argues that the relationship between these two sets of candidate attri-
butes may be interactive. By conceptualizing social characteristics as a
valence factor, one could reach a diﬀerent interpretation than ours.
Mondak and Huckfeldt (2006) show that valence factors matter less
when candidates are centrist, i.e., have unclear political positions, than
Fig. 5. Change in the predicted probability of
preferring a candidate when the candidate's
issue positions are the same as or diﬀerent
from those of the respondents for the issue
(left panel) and both treatments (middle
panel) and the diﬀerence in the change in the
predicted probability of preferring a candi-
date between treatments (right panel).
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when they have extreme, i.e., have clear political positions. Franchino
and Zucchini (2015) even argue, building on evidence from a conjoint
experiment, that valence factors and policy positions are not separable
at all, while we ﬁnd diﬀerences in candidate choice depending on
whether candidates’ social characteristics, issue positions, or both are
shown, hinting at a separation. In any case, our ﬁndings may not
contradict this literature because respondents in our sample simply may
not see the social characteristics we assign to candidates as valence
factors or proxies for valence factors. Generally, the interactive re-
lationship between policy preferences, social characteristics that serve
as valence factors, and candidate choice is empirically debated in other
works. While Green and Hobolt (2008); Buttice and Stone (2012) ﬁnd
that valence matters more for candidates of similar ideology, Pardos-
Prado (2012); Clark and Leiter (2014) show the opposite.
When social markers are merely a proxy for other candidate char-
acteristics, such as competence, we also face an identiﬁcation problem.
Carnes and Sadin (2014) ﬁnd in a survey experiment that upper-class
candidates are seen as more competent than their working-class alter-
natives, and Smith et al. (2007) show that citizens attribute higher
political skills to men than to women. While we do not attribute class to
candidates directly, we assign them an occupation and gender. The
above ﬁndings, then, imply for our study that citizens may infer com-
petence or skills from occupation and gender but not as much from, say,
knowing a candidate's level of education or region of residence. In other
words, we may not be easily able to compare the relative importance of
those two sets of characteristics on candidate choice estimated in our
experiment because their eﬀect on electoral decisions could follow
diﬀerent mechanisms. One such mechanism that links social char-
acteristics such as gender and the attribution of competence are gender
stereotypes. Citizens could regard women as better at addressing some
political issues than men or vice versa (Holman et al., 2016;
McDermott, 1998; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993), so political pre-
ferences on certain issues matter less for voters' choices not because of
candidates' positions but because of candidates' credibility to imple-
ment meaningful policy on that issue.
6.2. Robustness of treatment eﬀects
Our experimental design addresses the problems that candidates'
social characteristics and policy positions are correlated and that social
characteristics themselves may proxy for one another (e.g., occupation
and educational level). We argued that these grounds that an experi-
mental design is clearly preferable to an observational study to robustly
identify the independent and interactive eﬀects of those candidate at-
tributes on candidate choice. An experiment allows us to present re-
spondents with every potential counterfactual, every possible combi-
nation of candidates' social characteristics and political preferences,
breaking correlations between candidate attributes that may hinder
identiﬁcation. This is also important because who runs for oﬃce and
who is elected is certainly a function of candidates' social markers and
issue positions. Women, for example, are less likely to select into po-
litical competition and less likely to believe that they qualify for public
oﬃce (Kanthak and Woon, 2015; Fox and Lawless, 2010, 2011). To
elicit demand eﬀects (citizens’ direct preferences for candidates) sepa-
rately from supply eﬀects (who runs for oﬃce) we must use randomized
assignment of attributes to hypothetical candidate proﬁles.
Obviously, the decision situation faced by the respondents in our
experiment is a hypothetical choice between two candidate proﬁles.
Issues with identiﬁcation, internal validity, and external validity im-
mediately arise. A ﬁrst concern is an experiment eﬀect whereby re-
spondents are forced to choose, to trade oﬀ diﬀerent attributes that they
otherwise would not have. Second, hypothetical choices sometimes
imply a larger degree of intrinsic motivation than real-world choices.
Third, pre-treatment eﬀects – such as accounting for local political
contexts, the timing of elections, or particular prominent politicians –
may prevent us from obtaining an unbiased estimate of the AMCE. We
acknowledge these concerns but argue that the treatment eﬀects we
identify among subjects from the comparison of the group, issue, and
both treatment conditions are not aﬀected provided that subjects are
balanced across treatment conditions.17
Fig. 6. Change in predicted probability that respondents believe a hypothetical candidate agrees with the issue statement; proportions shown by candidates' social
characteristics.
17 We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between treatment groups at =α .05 in
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Generally, we need to restrict the generalizability of our claims in
several ways: First, we note that the current electoral system in Norway
is not yet personalized to the extent that voters are allowed to directly
choose between candidates; it remains a party-list system. The external
validity of the claims we make can only be judged if and when the
electoral system actually changes. Until then, the behavior we predict
remains a hypothetical, albeit, as we argue, an interesting hypothetical.
Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto (2015) also show that con-
joint experiments, even if abstract in nature, produce externally valid
estimates when their results are compared to real-world outcomes. We
further employ a nationally representative sample of the Norwegian
electorate.
Second, we may speak to questions about representation as they
relate to particular social cleavages; for our study this is gender and
educationally driven divides. One result is important in this respect:
The respondents in our study show a general appreciation for female
candidates in the group treatment (when no information on candidates'
policy positions is available). This ﬁnding is in line with meta-evidence
on voters' preferences for female candidates in conjoint experiments
(Schwarz et al., 2018). We add to this literature that such a preference
may not be robust to the decision situation voters face. In our both
treatment (when respondents also see information on candidates’ policy
positions) the favorable attitude toward female candidates disappears.
We also do not ﬁnd that women appreciate descriptive representation;
on this topic, previous experimental studies have found conﬂicting
evidence (Carnes and Lupu, 2016; Aguilar et al., 2015). We discuss
social divides related to education and what we may learn from our
results for representation based on education in the conclusion.
Finally, when respondents are shown information on candidates'
social characteristics or policy positions, they may simply infer parti-
sanship and choose based on that marker. Indeed, (Kirkland and
Coppock, 2017) show an interaction between whether partisanship is
known to voters and the eﬀect of other candidate characteristics, i.e.,
competence, on candidate choice. In general, many studies argue that
social characteristics do not independently aﬀect candidate choice but
are always moderated by partisanship (Hayes, 2011; Huddy and
Capelos, 2002). We argued earlier that there is value in not considering
the party aﬃliation of the candidates in our experiment because par-
tisanship leads respondents to make inferences about other omitted
candidate characteristics. In other words, we sought to achieve control
over what respondents may infer from partisanship in their decision-
making between candidates by omitting party labels at the cost of al-
lowing respondents to infer partisan labels from the candidate char-
acteristics that we provide. The former would mean that we could not
learn about the independent eﬀect of some of our attributes of interest
because party labels may be a very dominant determinant in voters’
decision-making, whether directly or as proxy for other omitted can-
didate attributes. The latter would mean that we induce a latent vari-
able, party label, that voters infer from the candidate characteristics
shown.
Suppose that respondents infer a candidate's party from the candi-
date characteristics they know; then, we would face yet another issue
regarding a lack of internal validity in our experimental design: When
we consider a candidate choice to be driven by (shared) social char-
acteristics and/or issue positions, we may be mistaken, and candidate
choice may instead be driven by inferred party labels. We may also err
when we contend that the smaller eﬀect of social characteristics on
candidate choice when respondents also learn about candidates' issue
positions is evidence for the existence of a mechanism whereby citizens
make inference from the social characteristics provided through de-
scriptive representation to select a candidate who shares their sub-
stantive interest. One alternative interpretation is that once candidates'
issue positions are known, citizens are much better able to infer the
candidates' partisanship and decide based on that information than
when they know only candidates' social characteristics.
For this study, however, we decided to omit partisan labels, as si-
milar studies have done in the past (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Franchino
and Zucchini, 2015). Our target of inference is learning about the re-
lationship between social characteristics and issue positions in its eﬀect
on citizens' preferences over representatives independent of the inﬂu-
ence of party platforms or partisanship. Furthermore including parti-
sanship entails a signiﬁcant challenge for experimental design: A full
randomization over social characteristics and policy positions when the
proﬁle shown to respondents also includes candidates’ party labels is
problematic. In some cases, the shown issue positions in combination
with a particular party membership, for example a candidate from a
conservative party who strongly disagrees with reducing immigration,
will seem unreasonable to the respondent. In this way, the respondents
preference over candidates we elicit will be a biased measure of their
true preference given the confusion that such an unreasonable candi-
date proﬁle provides. Future research, bearing in mind the challenges
for experimental design we just presented, should certainly investigate
the robustness of the mechanism we present to including partisan labels
in the hypothetical candidate proﬁles.
7. Conclusion
We designed two conjoint experiments embedded within the
Norwegian Citizen Panel to investigate the use of descriptive informa-
tion (social characteristics) and substantive information (issue posi-
tions) when choosing between candidates. We ﬁnd that citizens pay
attention to social characteristics when they choose candidates and
prefer to be represented by an in-group candidate on selected attribute
dimensions (educational level, religion, and occupation). Both ﬁndings
disappear when respondents also know candidates’ issue positions. We
argued that these results imply that citizens have instrumental in-
centives for choosing candidates who share their social characteristics
and that is why respondents prefer their in-group candidates.
We then proceeded to test directly whether descriptive representa-
tion is valuable to citizens because of the instrumental beneﬁts it car-
ries, whether voters are able to infer and actually do infer candidates'
issue positions from their social markers. We ﬁnd that citizens, indeed,
hold commonly accepted beliefs about which social characteristics
align with particular political preferences of a candidate and, im-
portantly, clearly desire representatives who share their political pre-
ferences. We could not robustly establish, however, whether citizens
connect that knowledge obtained from knowing candidates' social
markers and their desire to be substantively represented. The direct
experimental test of whether descriptive representation facilitates
substantive representation pointed in the expected direction but did not
produce a statistically signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect. Nevertheless, citi-
zens infer potential representatives' issue positions from the latters’
descriptive characteristics; therefore, they are able to achieve the better
substantive representation they clearly desire.
We also provide insights into the discussion about the beneﬁts of
personalizing electoral systems, which is happening across democ-
racies. In a more personalized, direct candidate choice system, voters
are better able to choose a representative that descriptively and sub-
stantively represents them well. This phenomenon occurs because vo-
ters have the opportunity to directly choose a candidate with desired
characteristics and policies and not through a party list. In some in-
stances, however, the advantages of being descriptively represented
and those of being substantively represented are at odds – which may
(footnote continued)
any of respondents' social characteristics (age, gender, relationship status,
educational level, religion, occupation, and region of residence) or in re-
spondents' attitudes on the three policy issues (income inequality, refugee
rights, and emissions reductions). Results are based on Fisher's exact test for the
categorical variables and a Welch two-sample t-test as well as Wilcoxon's rank-
sum test for the variable age.sss.
S. Arnesen et al. Electoral Studies 57 (2019) 46–60
57
explain our ﬁnding of a greater emphasis on the latter than on the
former.
From our result that more highly educated representatives are
generally preferred, we argue that a lack of descriptive representation
for less-educated citizens may arise and lead to detrimental substantive
representation for that already disadvantaged group. Political decision-
makers tend to be more responsive to the policy preferences of highly
educated, politically active and aﬄuent citizens (Bartels, 2016; Adams
and Ezrow, 2009). These highly skilled, strongly motivated, and well-
connected citizens tend to participate in society to a disproportionate
degree, and the education level of citizens is the social characteristic
most closely associated with political participation (Wolﬁnger and
Rosenstone, 1980). Unequal participation in civil society and politics
spills over into unequal political representation because those who fail
to exert inﬂuence in decision-making bodies are likely to have diﬀerent
political needs, interests, and preferences from groups that are actively
engaged in society and politics (Gallego, 2014). In other words, less-
educated citizens are not represented by someone who shares their
educational level, but better educated citizens are.
To the extent that one objective of the electoral system is to ensure
better representation of all strata of society, including less-educated
citizens, a reform that introduces more personalized candidate choice is
unlikely to meet this objective. While less-educated citizens should
desire that education-based descriptive representation be used to also
achieve substantive representation, we ﬁnd exactly the opposite: less-
educated citizens fail to recognize the value of educational descriptive
representation. Therein lies the irony. For most of the 20th century,
many countries had large social-democratic, socialist, communist, and
agrarian political parties that explicitly focused on representing the
interests of lower-class citizens (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), helping to
overcome biases in participation. In an electoral system that allows
more personalized representation, when we reduce the inﬂuence of
parties said to be too distant from many groups in society, the interests
of less-educated citizens may be even less well represented than under
the status quo.
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